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In order to have an effective and efficient environmental policy, it is necessary to 
complement the legislative texts with a monitoring and enforcement strategy. Without 
such a strategy, the regulation’s target group will have little or no incentive to comply 
with the rules and the environmental objectives are not likely to be met. Over recent 
years an extensive theoretical literature on the monitoring and enforcement aspects of 
environmental regulations has emerged (see Cohen (2000b) and Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000) for literature overviews). However, the volume of empirical studies has been 
lagging behind and still not much is known about the use and the impact of various 
instruments used by environmental agencies.  
This paper provides an overview of several empirical studies with respect to sanctioning 
decisions for environmental offences. Our main objective is to determine the factors that 
might influence the level of the sanctioning instruments. Thus we focus on the stringency 
of the sanctions that are imposed on violators. We do not consider the impact of these 
sanctions on the compliance behaviour of the firms and individuals. However, Cohen 
(2000a) provides a review of the empirical research on the effectiveness of monitoring 
and enforcement of environmental policy in deterring individuals and firms from 
violating environmental laws. Also we do not investigate the empirical research on 
monitoring the compliance status of firms. Several studies have looked at the factors that 
influence the inspection decisions of environmental agencies. Some examples of such 
studies are Dion et al. (1998), Helland (1998b), Stafford (2002), Anderson and Stafford 
(2003) and Rousseau (2007). 
In section 2 we provide some general background on the motivation of using penalties 
against environmental violators. Section 3 describes five categories of variables that 
might influence the sanction that is imposed. Next a summary of empirical findings is 
presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
1  I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the SBO project 60034 ‘Environmental law 
enforcement: a comparison of practice in the criminal and the administrative tracks’. Moreover I would 
like to thank Carole M. Billiet for her useful suggestions. 
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II. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Environmental violations are disciplined largely through legal and regulatory penalties. 
The traditional justification in criminal law for imposing punishment is the observation 
that a punishment should be imposed that reflects the perceived gravity of the crime and 
the culpability of the offender. This model is generally accepted as the most significant 
one for criminal penalties, although other factors such as deterrence, and approaches such 
as restorative justice, are widely acknowledged and debated. This model is less dominant 
for regulatory penalties since many of the relevant provisions are directed at enhancing 
social or economic organisation, and contraventions are, therefore, regarded as having 
less need for moral condemnation (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2002). As a 
case in point, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states that penalties 
promote environmental compliance and help protect public health by deterring future 
violations by the same violator and deterring violations by other members of the 
regulated community. 
One important purpose of penalties for environmental offences is thus deterrence. There 
are two aspects to deterrence: specific and general. Specific deterrence seeks to deter the 
offender from re-offending by pricing and punishing the breach. General deterrence 
seeks to signal to others the price of a breach, or conversely, the benefits of compliance. 
Moreover, once the decision to violate has been taken, the size of the violation depends 
only on the marginal, not the average, properties of the expected penalty function. It is 
not the size of the penalties that matters, but rather the ‘speed’ with which they increase 
with the degree of violation. This is the theory of marginal deterrence (Mookherjee and 
Png, 1994). 
Glicksman and Earnhart (2007) provide additional insights into the comparative 
effectiveness of government interventions on the environmental performance of regulated 
firms. This study compares the effects of administrative and civil fines on environmental 
performance and focuses on the industrial sector of chemical and allied products in the 
US. If civil fines typically receive more publicity than administrative fines, then one 
would expect civil fines to act as stronger general deterrents than administrative fines. 
The multivariate regression analysis identifies both the effect of an additional dollar from 
an administrative fine and the effect of an additional dollar from a judicial fine on 
wastewater discharges relative to permit limits. They find that administrative fine-related 
specific deterrence is more effective than civil fine-related specific deterrence. However, 
civil fines are significantly more effective than administrative fines in terms of their 
general deterrence. Further they find that federal fines (civil and administrative fines 
combined) are effective as general deterrents but ineffective as specific deterrents. In 
contrast, state fines are ineffective as general deterrents and even counterproductive as 
specific deterrents. 
In 2002 the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) performed an inquiry into the 
role of civil and administrative fines. The potential scope of this inquiry is enormous 
since it refers to a vast array of legislation and regulation, including environmental rules. 
For example, it must consider where civil and administrative penalties are appropriate 
and the limitations, if any, on their application to particular sorts of offences. In   3
particular, the ALRC is directed to report on principles for setting the level of penalties, 
both in relation to the maximum penalties for a particular offence and those to be applied 
and determined by the relevant decision-making forum in any particular case. The 
enforcement of penalties is also to be considered. With respect to penalty setting, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (2002) reports three major categories of 
information taken into account in sentencing:  
•  the general aims of the penalty, to achieve one or more of the following: to exact 
retribution; deter others from committing similar offences; rehabilitate the 
offender; denounce the action; and protect the community;  
•  the particular circumstances of the offence such as: its gravity compared to others 
in the same category; social danger; harm actually done; the prevalence of the 
type of offence; and the degree to which the offender was responsible for the 
offence;  
•  the characteristics of the offender that may mitigate his or her culpability for the 
offence or indicate the likelihood or otherwise of re-offending. 
 
III. CATEGORISATION OF PENALTY DETERMINANTS 
Based on a literature overview, we distinguish five different categories of factors that can 
influence the type and level of the sanction for environmental violations: (i) 
characteristics of the defendant, (ii) violation characteristics, (iii) environmental 
characteristics, (iv) political characteristics and (v) legal characteristics. Subsequently we 
discuss each category in more detail. 
 
3.1 Defendant characteristics 
The relevant characteristics of the individual or firm can be captured by the following 
variables: 
-  firm size (number of employees) 
-  financial health (gross rate of return, turnover, profitability, liquidity) 
-  probability that plant will close during industry contraction (growing versus 
declining industry) 
-  percentage of county work force employed at plant 
-  industry/economic activity (agriculture, heavy industry, government, military) 
-  industry size 
-  international company 
-  plant ownership 
-  company trades on stock exchange 
-  yearly emissions 
-  type of industrial process used (type of technology) 
-  compliance history (number of violations in previous year, number of sanctions)   4
-  number complaints (in previous year) 
-  community demographics (unemployment rate in plant’s county, median 
household income, percentage college graduates, percentage home owners, 
number of people in neighbourhood) 
-  firm location (inspection region, city) 
The fine which is imposed should reflect the means of the individual or company 
concerned. Ability to pay is a factor correlated with size as well as financial health. In the 
case of a large company the fine should be substantial enough to have a real economic 
impact which, together with the bad publicity resulting from prosecution, will create 
sufficient pressure on management and shareholders to tighten regulatory compliance 
and change company policy (Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2000). It should be recognised 
that where pollution on a substantial scale has been occasioned by a large company, it is 
only the company itself (rather than individual directors) which will have the financial 
means to meet a fine proportionate to the degree of damage which has occurred. Yeager 
(1991) found that large firms tended to be treated less harshly than small ones in his 
study of water pollution regulation, while DiMento (1986) found that large firms tended 
to require larger sanctions in order to modify their behaviour. For smaller companies, the 
courts should bear in mind that a very large fine may have a considerable adverse impact. 
A crippling fine may close down the company altogether, with employees being thrown 
out of work, and with repercussions on the local economy. Alternatively, a large fine may 
make it even more difficult for the company to improve its procedures in order to comply 
with the law. Similar considerations apply to non-profit-making organizations, which do 
not have shareholders. 
Before arriving at the sentence, the court should take account of personal mitigating 
factors, including the defendant’s good environmental record. Firms from industries with 
bad reputations for environmental compliance can be expected to receive higher penalties 
(Hawkins, 1984 and Kagan and Scholz, 1984). If the defendant has previous convictions 
for similar offences, or has failed to respond to previous sentences, this should be treated 
as a factor that increases the sentence, but not to an extent that would be disproportionate 
to the facts of the case. As shown by, among others, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) 
repeat offenders can be fined more heavily. 
Environmental justice advocates have suggested that penalties for violating 
environmental violations are systematically lower in poor and minority areas. The 
empirical evidence for this claim has, however, been scarce (Ringquist, 1998, Lynch et 
al., 2004 and Atlas, 2001). 
 
3.2 Violation characteristics 
Several attributes of the environmental violation are likely to have a sizeable influence on 
the penalty that is imposed. These attributes include: 
-  type of legislation that was violated 
-  medium (surface water, ground water, air, soil) 
-  type of violation (permit, emission, administrative) 
-  type of damage (noxious, widespread, pervasive, long-lasting effects)   5
-  effects on human health / animal health / flora 
-  high priority violations 
-  multiple media 
-  contaminant (oil, chemical, other) 
-  duration 
-  seriousness (categories) 
-  measured damages 
-  financial gain associated with violation (profit or cost saving) 
-  compliance cost 
-  cause (human error, technical error, poor storage, transport, improper 
maintenance, other, unknown, natural) 
-  intent (accidents, unforeseeable circumstances) 
-  discovery of violation (voluntary report, random inspection, complaint) 
-  mitigating actions (cleanup, damage control)  
-  enforcement effort of authorities (previous warnings, advices or cautions) 
-  year / season 
Any of the following factors may be taken to enhance the culpability of a defendant, 
whether an individual or a company, and thereby to aggravate the seriousness 
(Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2000):  
(a) the offence is shown to have been a deliberate or reckless breach of the law, rather 
than the result of carelessness; 
(b) the defendant has acted from a financial motive, whether of profit or of cost saving, 
for example by neglecting to put in place the appropriate preventative measures or by 
avoiding payment for the relevant license; 
(c) the defendant has failed to respond to advice/caution/warning from the relevant 
regulatory authority; 
(d) the defendant has ignored relevant concerns voiced by employees or others; 
(e) the defendant is shown to have had knowledge of the specific risks involved, e.g. 
when he has knowingly dumped “special” waste; 
(f)  the defendant’s attitude towards the environment authorities was dismissive or 
obstructive. 
The following factors, which relate to the actual or potential extent of the damage, may 
also be taken to aggravate the seriousness of the offence (Sentencing Advisory Panel, 
2000): 
(a) the pollutant was noxious, widespread or pervasive, or liable to spread widely or have 
long-lasting effects; 
(b) extensive clean-up, site restoration or animal rehabilitation operations were required; 
(c) other lawful activities were prevented or significantly interfered with. 
It is important that the sentence takes full account of any economic gain achieved by the 
offender by failure to take the appropriate precautions; it should not be cheaper to offend   6
than to prevent the commission of an offence. Conversely, the expense of any remedial 
action already taken by the defendant might lead the court to reduce the level of the fine 
it would otherwise have imposed. Penalties should ensure that the firm gains no financial 
benefit from its illegal emissions and should closely approximate the pollution abatement 
costs that the firm has avoided (corrected for the probability of detection). 
The level of the fine should reflect how far below the relevant statutory environmental 
standard the defendant’s behaviour actually fell. The assessment of seriousness requires 
that the court should consider the culpability of the defendant in bringing about, or 
risking, the relevant environmental harm. Among the factors that may be taken to reduce 
the seriousness of any of the offences under consideration are the fact that the individual 
defendant played a relatively minor role in the commission of the offence, or had 
relatively little personal responsibility for it; the fact that the defendant genuinely and 
reasonably lacked awareness or understanding of the regulations specific to the activity 
in which he was engaged; the fact that the offence was an isolated lapse. Intentional 
violations are expected to bring about higher penalties compared to accidents or 
unforeseeable circumstances. The cause of the incident (human error, technical error, 
poor storage or other) gives an indication of corporate and/or employee negligence 
(Earnhart, 2000). 
Before arriving at the sentence, the court should take account of personal mitigating 
factors, including: the defendant’s prompt reporting of the offence and ready co-
operation with the enforcement authorities; the fact that the defendant took steps to 
remedy the problem as soon as possible; and a timely plea of guilty. The relationship 
between the firm and the regulatory agency (i.e. the firm’s cooperative history) also 
influences the penalty that is imposed. Moreover, the way the violation is discovered 
matters: voluntary reports can be expected to result in lower penalties than situations 
where the inspection agency discovers the violations on its own or receives third-party 
complaints. 
 
3.3 Environmental characteristics 
Since the environmental damage depends on the particular geographical and temporal 
context of the violation, the characteristics of the physical environment also matter:  
-  surface water quality  
-  air quality 
-  soil quality 
-  weather conditions 
-  vulnerable habitats (endangered species) 
The seriousness of the offence increases if human health, animal health, or flora were 
adversely affected, especially where a protected species was affected, or where a site 
designated for nature conservation was affected. The extent of the damage that has 
actually occurred or has been risked needs to be balanced against the defendant’s 
culpability (Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2000). The level of the fine should be high 
where the defendant’s culpability was high, even if a smaller amount of environmental 
damage has resulted from the defendant’s actions than might reasonably have been   7
expected. Such a case might arise where damage (or more extensive damage) has been 
avoided through prompt action by the authorities, or through some fortuitous element, 
such as helpful weather conditions. Conversely, in a case where much more damage has 
occurred than could reasonably have been expected, the sentence, while giving weight to 
the environmental impact, should primarily reflect the culpability of the offender 
(Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2000). 
 
3.4 Political characteristics 
Political factors influencing sanctioning decisions include: 
-  the composition of regional and federal government 
-  the political party dominating city council. 
Changes in the political environment might change, among other things, the preferences 
of administrations, budget allocation rules, policy priorities or sentencing guidelines. 
Consequently these changes might have an impact on the penalty imposed on 
environmental violators. 
 
3.5 Legal characteristics 
The final category of determinants is related to the legal institutions and procedures that 
are associated with the enforcement of environmental regulations. These determinants 
are, among others, 
-  the party bringing the action 
-  the type of court 
-  judge characteristics 
-  the number of plaintiffs 
-  the number of defendants 
-  the presence of third parties 
-  whether the defendant is an individual or a company 
-  the number of violations charged against defendant 
-  dummy if court’s decision is published 
-  costs for public prosecutor 
-  the court costs (number of cases filed in court during the year) 
Penalties will typically increase with the costs that are associated with the sanctioning 
procedure. As, for instance, Polinsky and Shavell (2000) state, the optimal fine should 
rise with the enforcement costs. Also, the presence of third parties might imply that the 
violation was potentially more damaging to other persons and thus the sanction might be 
higher. Moreover, different courts can have different objectives. As Billiet en Rousseau 
(2003) and Rousseau and Billiet (2005) show, the fines imposed by the court of appeal 
are differently motivated from the fines imposed by the courts of first instance in 
Flanders.   8
 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
First we summarise the descriptive information on the level and type of penalties that can 
be found in the empirical literature. Next we go over several empirical estimations of 
penalty functions for environmental offences. 
 
4.1 Data and descriptive information 
An important source of data on environmental enforcement is the Environmental and 
Compliance History Online (ECHO) database provided by US EPA (United States’ 
Environmental Protection Agency). This online database (previously called DOCKET) 
provides, among other things, data on the enforcement actions of the agency. From 2001 
onwards all judicial cases which were filed in court, had a settlement entered or were 
concluded can be searched. Also the database can be searched for all administrative 
enforcement cases with a complaint or proposed order issued, a final order issued or with 
an enforcement action closed. It is also possible to search outcomes of the enforcement 
cases with respect to the federal penalty assessed or agreed to, the value of the complying 
actions and the value of Supplemental Environmental Project activities. Prior research 
that used this database includes Lavelle and Coyle (1992), Ringquist (1998), Atlas (2001) 
and Helland (2001). 
We now discuss some descriptive information on enforcement strategies for 
environmental violations in Europe, Canada and the US. 
 
4.1.1 Europe 
Billiet and Rousseau (2005) and Rousseau (2007) investigate the enforcement actions 
taken after or during an inspection which found a Flemish textile firm in violation. The 
environmental agency can issue advices, warnings or notices of violations.
2 An advice is 
given to recommend the firm to make sure that the present situation of compliance with 
regulations continues in the future.
3 A warning, on the other hand, is provided to instruct 
the firm to end the present situation of non-compliance and abide with all appropriate 
laws, decrees, and permits. A notice of violation (NOV)
4 formally documents a violation. 
This document can be used as evidence in a court of law and a copy is send to the Public 
Prosecutor. Moreover, the agency can also use administrative sanctions, such as making a 
motivated proposal to the administration in power to suspend or withdraw the firm’s 
environmental permit. The latter sanctioning instrument does not occur in the sample. 
                                                 
2 The use and definitions of these enforcement instruments can be found in art. 30 of the Environmental 
Permit Decree and art. 64 of Vlarem I. 
3 In practise this instrument is also used for minor administrative violations (such as the presence of a fire 
safety report) and to enforce previously issued warnings. In our sample, 19 of 20 advices follow a 
violation. 
4 Internal regulations of AMI state that the civil servants do not always have to issue a notice of violation 
when violations are discovered. They have the power to evaluate the situation and use their professional 
competences to decide on the level of precaution and care displayed by the firm. However, a warning will 
always be sent to the firm if a violation was detected.   9
After detecting a violation, the inspection agency took some type of enforcement action 
in 20 to 30 % of the cases. This does not mean that the agency only reacts to 20 or 30 % 
of total violations. After all, it might take several visits – during which the firm is in 
violation – to formally prove the violations. It is also plausible that after the notice of 
violation accompanied by a warning has been issued, the firm’s violation will continue 
for quite some time. After all, it often takes time to comply. Requesting a new or 
extended license can take months. Building a new water purification station can even 
take years. Throughout this period, the agency is likely to pay some follow-up visits. 
During these visits they find the firm in violation (which they already knew) and take no 
further action (because they already did). 
Table 1 analyzes what happens after an inspection that found a firm in violation and 
focus, more specifically, on the monetary penalties imposed. As mentioned above, in the 
majority (72 %) of the cases no enforcement action was taken. The authors concentrate 
on the notices of violations that are issued, since a copy of those is always sent to the 
Public Prosecutor in order to start criminal prosecution. These violations can potentially 
lead to monetary penalties.  
 
















2 7165  Euro
First instance 15  2869 Euro
Settlement 16 260  Euro
Info 69
Dismissal 36  0
NOV 140
No info  71    
Warning 38       0
Advice 21       0
709 
No action  510         0
 
In the sample, only 25 percent of the cases (17 out of 69) are actually brought to trial. In 
23 percent of the cases (16 out of 69) a settlement is negotiated and the remaining cases 
(52%) are dismissed without further consequences. Looking at the average monetary 
penalty, we see that the average settlement amount is 260 Euro, the average fine at the 
first instance is 2869 Euro and the average fine at the Court of Appeal is 7165 Euro. The 
monetary penalty for violating environmental regulations in Flanders is apparently 
limited. The expected monetary sanction, combining fines and settlements, after a 
violation is detected equals only 87.7 Euro. There must therefore be other motivations for 
firms to comply with environmental policies. Typically, the environmental agency starts 
                                                 
5 We process here the information received by AMI on the follow-up on NOVs by the Prosecutor’s Office.   10
with more lax instruments only to move up to harsher ones and thus it proceeds through 
the different stages of an enforcement pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995) until it has 
secured an offender’s compliance. This threat of harsher punishment (e.g. firm closure) 
can be sufficient to make firms comply. 
Ogus and Abbot (2001) explore the deterrence dimension of using administrative 
penalties in the context of UK environmental regulation policy. The authors also consider 
the revocation and suspension of licenses. It is noted that these administrative penalties 
of revocation and suspension have potentially large financial consequences for operators 
and yet they are subject to administrative procedures, without the protection offered to 
offenders by the criminal process. 
There is evidence that the environmental agency in the UK fails to prosecute (Ogus and 
Abbot, 2001). Although the normal response to Category 1 (‘major’) incidents is 
prosecution, only 23% of such incidents, where the offender was identified, led to such 
action being taken and in 17% of cases, no action was taken at all. With regard to 
Category 2 (‘significant’) incidents, prosecution or formal caution are the possible 
responses. In only 27% of cases where the offender was identified was either action taken 
and in 30% of cases, no action was taken at all. There was also extensive non-compliance 
with the recommended response to Category 3 (‘minor) incidents, that being a warning 
letter or in some areas such as waste, a formal caution. Out of the five regions that 
provided data, warning letters or notices were issued in 4% to 29% of cases, with 
prosecutions or formal cautions being the response to another 2% to 10% of incidents. 
The average level of fines imposed by courts was £2786 in 1998 and £4750 in 1999. In 
1999 the average fine for prosecuted businesses and individuals was £9000 and £1000 
respectively. The amounts imposed are low relative to the profitability of the 
contravening activity. 
Nyborg and Telle (2006) present Norwegian data on enforcement and compliance with 
environmental regulations. The maximum criminal penalty for violations of 
environmental regulations is 15 years of imprisonment. In a criminal trial, fines may also 
be imposed upon persons or corporations, and profits gained through non-compliance 
may be confiscated. A criminal penalty (i.e. imprisonments or criminal fines) requires an 
investigation by the police, prosecution and a court conviction. In cases where 
imprisonment is not considered, the prosecution authority normally suggests a fine in lieu 
of prosecution. If the alleged criminal accepts the fine, the case is settled without a trial. 
The agency (NPCA) can initiate prosecution by filing a formal accusation. 
Usually, however, the first thing NPCA does when a violation is detected (or suspected) 
is to mail the firm a warning letter, stating in what ways the firm is believed to be out of 
compliance, indicating the seriousness of the violations, requesting documentation that 
the firm is in compliance within a given deadline, and pointing out the firm’s legal duty 
to comply with the instructions. If a firm provides the requested documentation within 
the deadline, the NPCA will normally take no further action. Violators failing to respond 
adequately to the warning, however, seem to be met by more formal and direct sanctions. 
Coercive fines or even withdrawal of emission permits are available to the NPCA 
(without prosecution). The use of administrative sanctions has not, at least until recently, 
been considered to rule out criminal sanctions. In practice, NPCA often awaits filing   11
formal accusations till informal and administrative sanctions are unsuccessfully 
exhausted. This implies that if a criminal sanction is imposed, the firm will usually 
already have paid (additional) administrative fines (Nyborg and Telle, 2006). 
 
4.1.2 Canada and US 
Further we mention two studies for Canada. Eckert (2004) examines the use of 
inspections and warnings to enforce environmental regulations for petroleum storage 
sites in Canada. Between 1983 and 1998, there were 3182 inventory inspections, 1567 
violations, 1531 warnings and 36 prosecutions. However, the data used do not include 
information on monetary sanctions. Foulon et al. (2002) study whether public disclosure 
programs can create incentives for pollution control in addition to the incentives 
normally set in place through traditional means of enforcement such as fines and 
penalties. Their empirical analysis uses data from the pulp and paper industry in Canada 
(BOD and TSS). Over the period 1987-1996, 24 pulp and paper plants were in operation 
in British Columbia but only the data from 15 plants were used for the estimation. There 
were 126 prosecutions against the plants in the sample; however, only 17 of these 
resulted in a fine being imposed. These fines totalled $582400. The average fine was 
$34250. The distribution of the fines that were imposed is shown in Figure 1. The 
analysis presents evidence that the public disclosure of environmental performance does 
















































































































Figure 1: Distribution of fines in US$ (Foulon et al., 2002) 
 
In the US regional and national EPAs use a mixture of fines, injunctions, civil 
prosecutions and even criminal prosecutions against recalcitrant violators. Helland 
(1998a) studies the US pulp and paper industry. Because of the lack of data, fines are not 
included in the analysis. However, some anecdotal evidence is provided. A RFF survey   12
found the average state penalty per notice of violation (NOV) to be $393 between 1978 
and 1983 with 15% of the inspections resulting in a NOV. More recent data from 
Louisiana (1995-1996) found an average fine per NOV of $619 and an average fine of 
$45080. Next to state fines the EPA has several other methods of sanctioning. In EPA 
region 5, 1995-1996 judicial actions resulted in an average penalty of $283487. In 
addition notices of violations are often used in court cases when individuals bring legal 
action against paper mills for damages. Additionally, mills in repeated violation are 
pressured into installing new and more costly abatement technology. The Region 5 data 
for 1995-1996 puts the average cost of correcting violations for which the authorities 
have obtained injunctive relief at $1310848. Finally, violations can also be used as 
evidence in criminal prosecution.   
 
4.2 Estimated penalty functions 
In this section the results of several studies that estimate penalty functions are described. 
The signs of the significant variables are indicated between brackets. We first discuss 
some European studies before turning to estimates of the US enforcement policy. 
 
4.2.1 Europe 
Billiet and Rousseau (2003) and Rousseau and Billiet (2005) examine the fines 
pronounced by the Court of Appeal in Ghent (Belgium) as well as the fines that were first 
imposed by the court of first instance for these cases. The empirical exercise uses the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal for the period 1990-2000 concerning (a) discharge 
permits (Law on Surface Waters 1971) and (b) environmental permits (the discharge 
permit was included in the environmental permit due to the Decree on Environmental 
Permits 1985).  
The fines pronounced in first instance (F) or in appeal (A) were explained as a function 
of: 
- Environmental factors: duration of the violation, a dummy if serious damage or 
nuisance was caused 
- Legal factors: costs for the public prosecutor, charges within the scope of the Law 
on Surface Waters (A -), the Environmental Permit Decree (F +), the Labour Safety 
Law, the Manure Decree (F +) or others, dummy if third parties were involved in 
the law suit (A +), dummy if defendant had criminal record (F +), level of intent of 
offence (A +), fine pronounced in first instance (A +) 
- Firm factors: dummy if defendant worked in growing / stagnating / declining 
industry 
- Other: dummy if case started in first instance before 1994 (A -) 
The analysis showed that the judging decisions in the Court of Appeal are based on 
different characteristics than the judging behaviour in the courts of first instance. The 
judges of the Court of Appeal take the intentions of the violator into account as well as 
the harm caused to third parties.   13
Another European study was executed by Earnhart (1997, 2000). Earnhart (2000) 
examines enforcement rules in two dimensions. The first involves the proper 
combination of corporate and employee penalties. The second dimension involves the 
choice of a liability rule (strict versus negligence). These choices typically depend on the 
ability of firm to penalise its employees internally. The database incorporates data on 
water-damaging accidents in the Czech Republic. In addition to corporate penalties 
(among other things, remediation requirements or mandatory cleanup) and employee 
fines, this database includes extensive details on accidents (e.g. date, location, cause, type 
of contaminant, economic classification of responsible party and resulting damages). 
Authorities in the Czech Republic can impose two types of corporate penalties: monetary 
fines and remediation requirements. According to the Water Administration Act, the 
monetary fine depends on the following factors: the quantity and nature of the harmful 
substance, the level of damages, the sensitivity of and the degree of protection granted to 
the affected water, remediation efforts and other circumstances. In addition, authorities 
may impose monetary fines on employees or organisations that help cause an accident, 
unless the employees’ actions represent a criminal offence. None of the three penalty 
types restricts the use of the other two types. Corporate monetary fines actually imposed 
average 2222$ (average wage in 1990 was 135$). Second, remediation costs required by 
the Czech water authorities were on average 1822$. Third, employee fines actually 
imposed average about 35$, which is roughly one week’s pay and is significantly smaller 
than the average measurement of damages (i.e. 809$) (Earnhart, 2000). 
The empirical application includes the following factors in order to select a penalty 
combination (corporate or employee penalties or both): 
-  Primary cause indicators (human error, technical error, poor storage, transport, 
other, unknown, natural) 
-  Secondary cause indicators (human error, technical error, poor storage, transport, 
other, unknown, natural) 
-  Economic activity (agriculture, heavy industry, other industry, citizen, military or 
foreign) 
-  Political economy (communist, democratic) 
-  Water (surface, ground) 
-  Contaminant (oil, chemical, other) 
-  Remediation cost 
-  Measured damages 
-  Surface water quality 
-  Year 
The results indicate that the choice of penalty depends on the links between accident 
causes and negligence. Moreover the estimation reveals an apparent variation across 
firms in their ability to penalise their employees internally. 
Earnhart (1997) analyses the different enforcement strategies implemented under two 
political regimes (communism versus democratic). The most interesting result is the 
strong effect of political influence on penalty decisions, especially under communism. 
The penalty that is imposed is estimated by the same factors as Earnhart (2000) plus 
some extra:   14
-  location of the accident (inspection region) 
-  fish killed by the accident (yes or no) 
The driving forces behind penalty decisions divide into five main categories: information 
on preventive effort, measured damages, environmental factors, regional factors and 
political influence. 
The tobit estimation of monetary fines under the communist regime found significant 
coefficients for: 
-  other cause (-) 
-  transport cause (-) 
-  measured damages (+) 
-  remediation costs (-) 
-  other industry (-) 
-  military/foreign entities (-) 
-  oil contaminant (+) 
-  some regional dummies 
The tobit estimation of monetary fines under the democratic regime found significant 
coefficients for: 
-  other cause (-) 
-  secondary human cause (+) 
-  remediation costs (+) 
-  military/foreign entities (-) 
-  surface water quality (+) 
-  some regional dummies 
 
4.2.2 United States of America 
The other empirical studies on the penalty for environmental offences investigate the 
enforcement practices in the US. We divide these studies according to the environmental 
regulation they are dealing with. 
 
Oil spills 
Epple and Visscher (1984) focus on oil spills by tank ships and tank barges in the US. 
The law makes the polluter responsible for the cost of cleaning up a spill in all cases and 
also provides for a civil penalty for intentional spills resulting from negligence. They 
seek to determine the extent to which the frequency of imposition of sanction and the 
severity of sanctions vary with the resources devoted to enforcement, characteristics of 
spills and characteristics of polluters. The data clearly confirm the increase in assessment 
of penalties and enforcement of cleanup as spill size increases, as the vessel size 
increases and as coast guard enforcement effort (man hours per transfer) increases. 
Cohen (1987) also focuses on the US Coast Guard’s oil spill prevention program and 
describes how the optimal enforcement strategy can be derived from the principal-agent 
literature. The analysis shows that the optimal penalty should depend on the   15
environmental damage, on the cleanup costs and on the probability of detection. The 
Coast Guard’s enforcement policy consists of a combination of detection, monitoring and 
penalties. Failure to report a discharge of oil is a criminal offence that carries a maximum 
penalty of $10000 and/or one year jail. The polluter is responsible for removal costs plus 
a penalty of $5000 is stated in the law. However, the actual fines imposed have generally 
been much less. 
The estimation of the penalty by Cohen (1987) includes the following variables: 
-  vessel size (+) 
-  spill size (+) 
-  enforcement effort of authorities (+) 
-  fraction cleaned up (-) 
-  time (-) 
-  spill location (inland waterway, beach) 
-  type of oil (crude oil, gasoline (-), distillate fuel oil, diesel oil, residual fuel oil) 
-  cause of spill (personnel error (+), improper maintenance (+), equipment failure 
(+), intentional discharge (+), natural cause) 
-  seasonal dummy 




Deily and Gray (1991) and Gray and Deily (1996) estimate the compliance and 
enforcement decisions for US integrated steel plants. The data include the number of 
enforcement actions directed toward each plant each year. These actions include 
inspections, letters, phone calls and enforcement orders. No data on fines were available. 
Firm characteristics had significant impacts on enforcement, although the signs were not 
always as expected. 





predicted plant compliance  -  Y (-) 
past compliance  -  Y (-) 
yearly emissions (in tons)  +  Y (+) 
attainment status of plant’s county (CAA)  -  Y (-) 
compliance cost  -  N 
probability that plant will close during 
industry contraction 
- Y  (-) 
percentage of county labour force employed 
at plant 
- Y  (-) 
unemployment rate in plant’s county  -  Y (+)   16
past enforcement actions  +  Y (+) 
past inspections  +  Y (+) 
firm’s gross rate of return  +  Y (-) 
plant ownership  ?  Y (+) 
Year dummies     
Regional dummies     
 
Tort litigation 
Eaton et al. (2005) examine the effect of the decision to seek punitive damages on several 
major decision points in the tort litigation process. The impact of trial outcomes on cases 
that are settled or not resolved by trial is often referred to as the ‘shadow effect’. With 
extensive control variables, the authors find that seeking punitive damages has no 
statistically significant effect on most phases of the tort litigation process. The decision 
points include (see Figure 2): 
-  whether a case filed in any given year was disposed or pending 
-  whether a disposed case was resolved by trial or by some other procedure (incl. 
settlement) 
-  whether a case disposed without trial was more likely to be disposed by 
settlement 
-  whether a case disposed without trial was more likely to be disposed by a 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice so that it could be refilled 
-  whether a case disposed by trial involved a jury or bench trial 
-  whether punitive damages were awarded in trials in which the plaintiff prevailed 
The control variables are: 
-  type of disposition (pending, without trial, settlement, with option to relitigate, 
trial, bench trial or jury trial) 
-  type of case 
-  case information (superior court, state court, request for punitive damages, 
wrongful death, number of plaintiffs, number of defendants) 
-  plaintiff type (individual, insurance, business, finance, medical, government, 
other) 
-  defendant type (individual, insurance, business, finance, medical, government, 
other) 
-  county 
-  year 
   17
 
Figure 2: Processing of tort claims (Eaton et al., 2005) 
 
White (2006) uses a data set of all asbestos claims that were filed in court between 1987 
and 2003 to investigate how forum shopping and procedural innovations affect asbestos 
trial outcomes. The analysis estimates the factors that influence: 
-  whether the defendant was found liable 
-  the amount of compensatory damages (if positive) 
-  whether the defendant had to pay punitive damage if found liable 
-  the amount of punitive damages (if positive) 
-  the amount of expected total damages 
The determinants include: 
-  plaintiff-specific variables (the plaintiff’s alleged disease, whether the plaintiff 
died before trial, age at trial, whether the plaintiff smoked, the number of 
defendants)   18
-  trial-specific variables (state or federal court, state in which trial occurred, the 
county in which trial occurred, the number of claims that were consolidated 
before trial, whether the trial was bifurcated or was a bouquet trial) 
The results indicate that forum shopping and procedural innovations have contributed to 
the growth of the asbestos mass tort both directly by raising damage awards and 
indirectly by raising settlement levels and the number of claims filed. 
 
Water pollution 
Kleit et al. (1998) study the civil penalties issued to water polluters by the Louisiana 
(US) Department of Environmental Quality in 1994. They find that penalties are more 
likely to occur, and are likely to be higher, the more severely a firm violates the 
regulation. Penalties are also likely to be higher if a firm has a previous record of 
environmental violations. Political influence, however, did not play an important role. 
Kleit et al. (1998) include the following factors in order to explain the amount of the civil 
penalty paid by the firms: 
-  number of previous enforcement actions (+) 
-  number of excursions committed by respondent (+) 
-  dummy if (no) permit (+) 
-  dummy for submission Monitoring Reports (-) 
-  dummy if permit expired (+) 
-  dummy if illegally discharged substance (+) 
-  regional dummies (-) 
-  political dummies (+) 
Oljaca et al. (1998) estimate a penalty function for water quality violations of private 
firms in Georgia (US). They find that the seriousness of the infraction and historical 
compliance records strongly influence penalty levels, while the intentionality of 
violations and the method of discovery do not. Oljaca et al. (1998) focus on penalties 
levied through consent decrees. Thus the penalties examined cover those cases where a 
cooperative enough climate exists for both firm and regulator to avoid the expense of 
more formal sanctions since these cases reached the consent decree stage. 
The fine paid was a function of the following explanatory variables: 
 
Explanatory variables  Expected sign  Significant? 
Major violations  Positive  Y (+) 
Intentional violations  Positive  N (+) 
Accidental violations  Negative  N 
Minor but frequently repeated violations  Positive  Y (+) 
Permit holder  ?  N 
Previous violations  Positive  Y (+) 
Violations discovered by citizens  Positive  N   19
Emergency response  Negative  N 
No emergency response  Positive  Y (+) 
From paper industry  Positive  Y (+) 
Violators who employ 20-99 workers  Positive  Y (+) 
Violators who employ more than 100 
workers 
Positive Y  (+) 
 
Magat and Viscusi (1990) deal with water pollution caused by the US pulp and paper 
industry. Based on the discharge reports (by firms and states), as well as on the findings 
of inspections, the EPA takes enforcement actions against violators. Informal actions 
include telephone calls, warning letters, and notices of violation, as well as inspections. If 
these measures do not achieve the intended results, the control agencies can proceed with 
formal actions such as administrative orders, permit revision, formal listing of companies 
as ineligible for government contracts, grants and loans; and, finally, civil and criminal 
judicial responses. During the period 1975-1985, the EPA commenced 64 judicial actions 
in the pulp and paper industry. Of these, 42 cases resulted in fines that varied from $1500 
to $750000, with an average of $89437. Due to lack of data, the determinants of the 
penalty could not be estimated.  
Nadeau (1997) focuses on the length of time that plants in the US pulp and paper 
industry spend in violation of EPA regulation. The paper explicitly separates the effect of 
monitoring (i.e. determining the firms’ compliance status) and enforcement activities 
(e.g. administrative orders, legal actions and penalties). The application estimates the 
enforcement activities using the following variables: 
-  Type of technology (kraft pulping (-) and pulp bleaching (+)) 
-  Plant size (+) 
-  Past compliance history (-) 
-  Potential amount of emissions (+) 
-  Attainment areas (-) 
-  State in which plant is located 
-  Time 
-  EPA administrator 
The signs of the significant variables are indicated between brackets. 
 
Environmental justice 
Environmental justice advocates have suggested that penalties for violating 
environmental violations are systematically lower in poor and minority areas. The 
empirical analysis performed by Ringquist (1998) shows, however, that such penalties 
are not smaller in these areas. The severity of the penalties is explained by the following 
variables:   20
-  Equity concerns (% of all households head by minority group, per capita 
personal income in ZIP code, percent college graduates, percent home 
owners) 
-  Case characteristics (regulatory dummies (-), number of violations charged 
against defendant (+), dummy for fortune 500 company (+), dummy for 
government entities, number of previous penalties (+), dummy for published 
decisions (+), dummy for multi-location penalties(+)) 
-  Judge attributes (dummy for appointees of each president) 
-  District political environment (value added by manufacturing of those 
industries most responsible for pollution as a percentage of gross state product 
in each state (+), League of Conservation Voters score of the senators, 
average LCV score) 
-  National political institutions (dummy for republican president (-), dummy for 
DOJ attorneys (+)) 
Atlas (2001) starts by criticising the work by Lavelle and Coyle (1992) and Ringquist 
(1998) and shows that their results might be unreliable. He then re-estimates the penalty 
function using an improved methodology. The analysis includes the following variables: 
-  minority proportion (+) 
-  median household income 
-  number of people in area 
-  year case ended (+) 
-  settled case (+) 
-  public defendant (-) 
-  type of violation (legislation (+), administrative order violation (-), failure to 
obtain permit) 
With respect to race characteristics, the analyses consistently revealed a modest 
relationship with penalties: penalties tended to be higher as the presence of minorities 
increased. 
Lynch et al. (2004) determine whether monetary penalties assessed against petroleum 
refineries for environmental violations differ depending on the racial, ethnic and income 
characteristics of communities surrounding the penalised refinery. In the period between 
2001 and 2003 the US EPA and state regulatory agencies assessed fines that ranged 
between $0 and $9999999. Nearly 50% of all fines were for amounts less than $15000. 
The control variables used to explain the monetary penalties imposed are: 
-  community demographics (proportion of African American residents, the 
proportion of Hispanic residents and median tract household income) 
-  compliance and enforcement history (significant non-compliance or high 
priority violations, past actions at the refinery) 
-  case characteristics (type of law violated (- for CWA), dummy for multimedia 
violations, number of facilities covered by penalty, dummy for state or federal 
agency (+), dummy judicial action or less formal order or negotiation)   21
-  company and facility characteristics (total annual company sales (+), the total 
number of company employees (-), dummy for subsidiary companies, score 
(1/2/3) for pollution performance prevention) 
-  political and economic climate (political party affiliation of state governor, 
value added by petroleum refinery industry as a percentage of the gross state 
product (-), US region) 
The result of the study on the association between race, ethnicity, income and penalty 
assessed is mixed. 
 
Combinations of environmental regulations 
Helland (2001) examines the political determinants of the EPA’s litigation strategy 
between 1977 and 1996. It studies the government’s choice of which cases to settle, 
which to litigate and how much to accept as a settlement. The ultimate resolution of a 
case is the result of a sequence of conditional choices. The decision to settle a case rather 
than proceed to trial is conditional on the expected outcome of the trial. In this model 
trial outcomes are assumed to be exogenous. 
The data for Helland (2001) are derived from EPA’s enforcement DOCKET database, 
which tracks civil and administrative enforcement cases under all environmental statutes. 
In the sample 94.5% of the 10478 cases are settled. Six percent of the cases are litigated. 
Of these cases EPA wins only 28.5%.  
The decision to go to trial rather than to settle is a function of: 
-  court costs (congestion = log of number of cases filed in federal court during 
the year (-), number of defendants (-), EPA budget (-)),  
-  the type of case (dummy for cases that involve an injunction (+), dummy for 
administrative case (-)),  
-  the type of defendant (dummy for individual (+)),  
-  the current administration (+),  
-  the preferences of the oversight committee (DNOMINATE scores measure 
the legislator’s position on a left-right continuum for House and Senate (-) 
oversight committee), 
-  the expected outcome at trial (+)  
-  risk aversion (probability of an EPA victory multiplied by predicted award 
squared, variance of expected award (-)) 
The probability that the EPA wins is determined by: 
-  the laws that were violated (+) 
-  the scope of the infraction 
-  the administration (-) and congressional variables 
-  region 
The settlement amount is a function of: 
-  the type of case (dummy for cases that involve an injunction (-))   22
-  number of defendants (+) 
-  the administration (-) 
-  expected trial outcome (-) and variance of expected award (+) 
The award at trial is determined by: 
-  laws that were violated (-) 
-  type of violation (asbestos, container violations, discharging pollution without 
a permit (+), improper disposal of pollution, excessive discharge of effluent, 
excess emissions, permit violations, failure to pre-treat discharge (+), 
violation of reporting requirements (+), spills and wetland protection (+)) 
-  number of facilities involved (+) 
-  administration (+) 
Karpoff et al. (2005) claim that environmental violations are disciplined largely through 
legal and regulatory penalties and not through reputational penalties. Reputational 
penalties measure the extent to which market-imposed penalties (e.g. consumer boycotts, 
increases in violators’ cost of capital or decreases in firms’ market value) impose 
significant costs on firms that violate environmental legislation. The total penalty 
consists of explicit legal sanctions imposed through regulatory, civil and criminal 
proceedings, plus reputational penalties. 
 
 
Table 2: Penalty (Karpoff et al., 2005) 
Using data from 478 environmental violations by publicly traded companies for US, 
Karpoff et al. (2005) find that economically meaningful and statistically significant 
losses in the firm’s share values correspond with these violations. However, it turns out 
that these losses are similar in size to these firms’ legal penalties. The legal penalties 
include fines, payments to damaged parties, compliance costs and cleanup expenses. For 
a subsample of 148 firms, the mean fine or damage award is $13.2 million, and the mean   23
forced compliance or remediation cost is $93.6 million (see Table 2). Table 3 provides 
summary information about the sample. 
 
 
Table 3: Sample information (Karpoff et al., 2005) 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this literature overview we investigate several empirical studies in order to analyse the 
sanctioning decision of environmental offences. We are able to distinguish five different 
groups of determining factors: (i) characteristics of the defendant, (ii) violation 
characteristics,  (iii) environmental characteristics, (iv) political characteristics and (v) 
legal characteristics. 
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